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Abstract
One	approach	to	characterizing	the	elusive	notion	of	emergence	is	to	define	that	a	property	is	emergent	if	and
only	if	its	presence	can	be	derived	but	only	by	simulation.	In	this	paper	I	investigate	the	pros	and	cons	of	this
approach,	focusing	in	particular	on	whether	an	appropriately	distinct	boundary	can	be	drawn	between
simulation-based	and	non-simulation-based	methods.	I	also	examine	the	implications	of	this	definition	for	the
epistemological	role	of	emergent	properties	in	prediction	and	in	explanation.
Emergence,	Simulation,	Explanation
	Philosophical	Approaches	to	Emergence
Philosophers	in	areas	ranging	from	the	philosophy	of	mind	to	the	philosophy	of	science	to	metaphysics	have
long	been	interested	in	emergence,	and	especially	in	trying	to	carve	out	a	coherent	definition	of	this	elusive	yet
potentially	very	useful	concept.	As	typically	used,	the	term	"emergent"	is	applied	to	certain	properties	of	whole
systems	of	interacting	parts,	whether	it	is	a	brain	made	up	of	individual	neurons,	an	anthill	made	up	of	individual
ants,	or	an	economy	made	up	of	individual	investors.	Putative	emergent	properties	might	include	mental	states
such	as	beliefs,	stock	market	crashes,	hurricane	formation,	and	so	on.
It	is	generally	agreed	that	some	properties	of	systems	are	emergent	and	others	are	not.	Thus	at	the	very	least,
an	adequate	definition	of	emergent	needs	to	be	non-vacuous,	i.e.	it	makes	room	for	some	actual	properties	to	be
emergent,	and	it	needs	to	be	non-trivial,	i.e.	not	all	properties	of	whole	systems	are	automatically	emergent.
Mark	Bedau	puts	the	issue	of	defining	emergence	in	terms	of	the	question	of	whether	there	is	room	for	a	well-
defined	notion	of	a	property	which	is	both	autonomous	but	also	constituted	by	the	underlying	processes.	If	we
give	up	on	the	constitution	condition	then	emergent	properties	threaten	to	'float	free'	of	the	underlying	processes
and	to	become	mysterious	or	magical.	If	we	give	up	on	the	autonomy	condition	then	it	is	not	clear	what	makes
emergent	properties	any	different	from	(so-called)	resultant	properties,	such	as	'_	weighs	9	kilograms,'	which
can	be	properties	of	whole	systems	but	which	are	presumably	not	emergent	in	any	significant	sense.	(Bedau
1997,	p.	375)
More	recently,	some	philosophers	have	argued	for	a	third	criterion	for	any	adequate	definition	of	emergence,	in
addition	to	non-vacuousness	and	non-triviality,	namely	that	the	defined	notion	be	relevant	to	scientific	practice.
Vague	though	this	criterion	is,	it	has	led	to	a	focus	on	the	cluster	of	approaches	including	neural	networks,
agent-based	models,	and	dynamical	systems	theory	which	has	come	to	be	referred	to	collectively	as	complexity
science.	Bedau	writes	that	"the	models	in	complexity	science	are	typically	described	as	emergent,	so	much	so
that	one	could	fairly	call	the	whole	enterprise	the	science	of	emergence."	(Bedau	2003,	p.	1)
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Weak	Emergence
In	Bedau	(1997;	2003),	Mark	Bedau	puts	forward	a	concept	he	terms	 weak	emergence,	and	argues	that	it	meets
all	three	of	the	criteria	mentioned	in	the	previous	section.	Bedau's	definition	operates	against	the	background	of
what	he	refers	to	as	"locally	reducible	systems."	These	are	systems	with	some	specified	set	of	components,
whose	macroproperties	depend	only	on	the	structural	properties	of	these	components.	Given	such	a	system	S,
and	some	property	P	of	the	system	then
P	is	weakly	emergent	if	and	only	if	P	is	derivable	from	all	of	S's	micro	facts	but	only	by	simulation.
(Bedau	2003,	p.	8) [1]
My	goal	in	this	paper	is	to	examine	the	pros	and	cons	of	this	approach	to	defining	emergence.	My	particular
interest	will	be	in	the	epistemological	ramifications	of	the	resulting	notion.	Questions	include:	How	(if	at	all)	can
weak	emergent	properties	be	predicted?	How	(if	at	all)	can	they	be	explained?	How	can	they	be	described?
Addressing	these	questions	will	also	involve	looking	in	more	detail	at	the	notion	of	simulation.
As	I	have	said,	my	concern	here	is	with	epistemological	issues	concerning	emergent	properties,	if	we	follow	an
approach	along	the	lines	of	Bedau's.	However	there	is	also	an	issue	about	whether	Bedau's	definition	is	itself
epistemological.	For	example,	Symons	describes	Bedau's	approach	as	an	"epistemological	characterization	of
emergent	properties"	(Symons	2008,	p.	2).	I	shall	argue	that,	although	it	is	framed	in	terms	of	the	resources
needed	for	certain	kinds	of	derivation,	Bedau's	definition	is	not	'epistemological'	in	any	interesting	sense,	for	it
does	not	make	the	notion	of	emergence	relative	to	the	cognitive	or	observational	capacities	of	a	particular	agent.
Bedau	himself	is	clear	that	he	intends	his	definition	to	be	objective,	in	contrast	for	example	to	characterizing
emergence	based	on	observer	surprise,	as	in	(Ronald	et	al.	1999 ).	By	way	of	analogy,	consider	the	standard
mathematical	definition	of	irrational	numbers	as	numbers	which	cannot	be	expressed	as	the	ratio	of	two
integers.	Although	phrased	in	terms	of	what	can	(or	cannot)	be	done	by	some	agent,	it	is	clearly	a	precise	and
objective	definition	which	does	not	depend	on	the	mathematical	capacities	of	a	particular	agent.	Thus	the	mere
fact	that	Bedau's	definition	has	a	certain	formulation	in	terms	of	what	is	required	for	some	cognitive	task	does
not	thereby	make	it	epistemological.	It	may	still	turn	out	to	be	epistemological,	but	only	if	the	notion	of	simulation
is	definable	only	relative	to	the	capacities	of	a	particular	theorizing	agent.
Before	discussing	the	extent	to	which	Bedau's	definition	of	weak	emergence	meets	the	three	criteria	listed
earlier,	it	may	be	helpful	to	look	at	how	the	definition	plays	out	in	a	particular	example.	Most	of	Bedau's	own
detailed	examples	operate	against	the	background	of	the	well-known	cellular	automata	system,	invented	by
mathematician	John	Conway,	known	as	the	"Game	of	Life."	(Berlekamp	et	al.	1982 )	The	background	'universe'
consists	of	an	infinite	two-dimensional	array	of	cells,	where	each	cell	can	either	be	'alive'	(black)	or	'dead'
(white).	At	each	time-step,	the	state	of	the	system	is	updated	according	to	the	following	single	rule:
Game	of	Life:	A	living	cell	remains	alive	if	and	only	if	either	two	or	three	of	its	neighbors	were	alive
at	the	previous	time	step;	a	dead	cell	becomes	alive	if	and	only	if	exactly	three	of	its	neighbors
were	alive	at	the	previous	time	step.
Depending	on	the	initial	configuration	of	black	and	white	cells,	the	above	simple	rule	can	lead	to	remarkably
complex	and	interesting	behavior	as	the	system	evolves	over	time.	One	macroproperty	which	Bedau	considers
is	the	property	of	indefinite	growth.	Some	initial	configurations	in	the	Game	of	Life	have	no	upper	bound	on	the
number	of	live	cells	that	occur	at	future	time	states,	while	others	do	have	an	upper	bound.	In	some	cases	it	is
easy	to	see	which	situation	obtains.	For	example,	an	empty	initial	configuration	will	stay	empty	(since	no	cell	will
ever	have	any	live	neighbors,	so	the	condition	for	cells	coming	alive	because	of	live	neighbors	will	never	be
fulfilled).	In	other	cases,	it	is	very	difficult.	Bedau	mentions	the	example	of	the	(so-called)	R	pentomino,	a	five-
cell	pattern	that	resembles	a	letter	R,	whose	behavior	is	described	by	Poundstone	(1985)	as	follows:	"On	a	high-
speed	computer	display,	the	R	pentomino	roils	furiously.	It	expands,	scattering	debris	over	the	Life	place	and
ejecting	gliders"	(p.	33).[2]	If	we	start	with	a	single	R	pentomino,	do	we	get	indefinite	growth?	Here	is	what
Bedau	says:
The	only	way	to	answer	this	question	is	to	let	the	Game	of	Life	"play"	itself	out	with	the	R
pentomino	as	initial	condition.	That	is,	one	has	no	option	but	to	observe	the	R	pentomino's
behavior.	As	it	happens,	after	1103	time	steps	the	R	pentomino	settles	down	to	a	stable	state	…
that	just	fits	into	a	51-by-109	cell	region.	(Bedau	2003,	p.	12)
Thus,	Bedau	concludes,	the	bounded	growth	of	the	R	pentomino	is	a	weakly	emergent	property	in	the	Game	of
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Sometimes,	instead	of	referring	to	simulation,	Bedau	talks	about	"iterating	the	microdynamic"	of	the	given
system,	and	this	seems	to	capture	well	what	is	going	on	in	the	R-pentomino	case.	(Humphries	2008,	p.	435)
uses	similar	language	when	he	describes	simulation,	in	the	sense	used	here,	as	"a	step-by-step	process	that
replicates	the	time	development	of	the	system	at	the	micro	level."	Bedau's	claim	is	that	the	only	route	to	deriving
the	property	of	bounded	growth	in	this	case	is	to	iterate	the	Game	of	Life	update	rule	time	step	by	time	step	until
stability	is	reached	at	step	1103.
Circumscribing	Simulation
With	the	above	example	in	hand,	let	us	now	return	to	the	question	of	the	adequacy	of	Bedau's	definition.	With
respect	to	the	third	criterion,	that	the	defined	notion	be	scientifically	relevant,	it	seems	clear	that	the	definition	is
successful.	Methodologically	speaking,	simulation	is	a	key	part	of	the	contemporary	study	of	complex	systems,
and	emergence	and	complexity	are	closely	tied	up	with	one	another.	By	linking	emergence	to	simulation	in	his
very	definition,	Bedau	effectively	builds	in	explicitly	the	scientific	relevance	of	the	resulting	notion.
The	criteria	of	non-vacuousness	and	non-triviality	are	harder	to	assess.	Recall	that	the	worry	was	that	the	notion
of	emergence	thus	defined	be	neither	too	strong	nor	too	weak.	The	first	step	is	to	identify	which	aspects	of
Bedau's	definition	connect	up	to	these	upper	and	lower	bounds	on	the	strength	of	the	defined	notion.	Notice	the
logical	shape	of	Bedau's	definition.	The	main	clause	is	an	'if	and	only	if',	so	it	gives	necessary	and	sufficient
conditions	for	a	property	to	be	weakly	emergent.	Then,	within	the	second	part	of	the	'if	and	only	if'	clause,	is	a
"can	…	but	only."	The	condition	that	weakly	emergent	properties	can	be	derived	by	simulation	is	intended	to
ensure	that	the	defined	notion	is	non-vacuous,	since	it	does	not	magically	'float	free'	of	the	underlying	processes
involved	(i.e.	the	microdynamic	state).	The	condition	that	the	only	means	of	derivation	is	simulation	is	intended
to	ensure	that	the	defined	notion	is	non-trivial,	since	it	rules	out	analytically	derivable	properties	that	are	merely
resultant.[3]	Thus	Bedau's	definition	has	the	right	form	to	steer	a	middle	road	between	vacuousness	and	triviality.
However—and	this	is	crucial—the	definition	depends	for	its	cogency	on	there	being	a	reasonably	well-defined
background	notion	of	simulation.	Otherwise	conditions	framed	in	terms	of	what	can	or	cannot	be	done	using
simulation	will	be	unacceptably	vague.	In	other	words,	the	above	approach	to	defining	weak	emergence	is	only
as	good	as	our	operating	notion	of	simulation.[4]
The	task	of	characterizing	simulation	may	proceed	either	by	trying	to	give	a	purely	formal	definition	of	simulation,
or	by	directly	considering	the	boundaries	between	simulation	and	non-simulation.	Concerning	the	first	approach,
(Rasmussen	and	Barrett	1995 )	argue	that	"unlike	computation	…,	simulation	does	not	have	a	well	established
conceptual	and	mathematical	foundation."	We	have	already	seen	an	implicit	equating,	by	Bedau	and	by
Humphries,	of	simulation	with	iteration	of	a	system's	microdynamic.	Rasmussen	and	Barrett	end	up	settling	on	a
similar	characterization,	defining	simulation	as
an	iterated	mapping	of	a	(usually	large	and	complicated)	system.	…	The	simulation	is	an	iterative
system	in	which	the	simulated	system	is	represented	and	its	dynamics	calculated.	(Rasmussen
and	Barrett	1995)
This	seems	to	capture	well	various	canonical	examples	of	simulation,	for	example	computer	simulations	of
weather	systems	or	of	the	flocking	behavior	of	birds.	But	does	it	help	in	placing	non-arbitrary	boundaries	around
the	core	notion	of	simulation?	I	shall	argue	that	it	does	not.
There	are	two	boundaries	to	consider.	Bedau	and	other	philosophers	sympathetic	to	his	notion	of	weak
emergence	tend	to	stress	the	specificity	of	simulation.	Every	step	of	every	microelement	is	calculated	until	the
given	property	appears.	To	stipulate	that	simulation	is	the	only	route	to	deriving	the	presence	of	a	particular
weakly	emergent	property	amounts	to	saying	that	there	is	no	'shortcut'	route	to	determining	this	fact,	no	way
around	this	completely	specific	procedure.	Sometimes	this	point	is	put	in	terms	of	the	computational
incompressibility	of	emergent	properties,	for	example	by	(Stephan	2006,	p.493)	who	describes	it	as
"incompressible	unfolding."	So	why	not	just	insist	that	proper	simulation	involve	full	specificity	of	this	sort?	There
are	two	problems	with	this	proposal,	as	I	hope	to	show	below.	Firstly,	even	fully	specific	simulations	are	only
specific	relative	to	a	particular	choice	of	microelements,	rather	than	being	specific	in	any	absolute	sense.
Secondly,	many	of	the	favored	examples	used	to	illustrate	(supposedly)	weakly	emergent	properties	are	not	fully
specific	even	relative	to	the	given	microelements.
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Full	Simulation
The	first	point,	about	specificity	being	relative	rather	than	absolute,	is	obscured	in	the	case	of	cellular	automata
such	as	the	Game	of	Life	because,	in	the	first	instance,	these	are	not	simulations	of	any	particular	real-world
system.	Hence	the	individual	cells	in	the	Game	of	Life	can	be	considered	absolutely	fundamental	and	'atomic.'
Once	we	move	to	canonical	examples	of	simulations	in	the	sciences,	however,	it	becomes	clear	that
microelements	do	not	have	any	privileged	ontological	status.	Indeed,	Bedau	makes	it	clear	that	he	sees	the
macro	/	micro	distinction	as	one	that	can	shift	with	different	contexts:
A	macro	level	in	one	context	might	be	a	micro	level	in	another;	the	macro	/	micro	distinction	is
context	dependent	and	shifts	with	our	interests.	(Bedau	2003,	p.	3)
For	example,	in	modeling	a	financial	market	we	might	develop	a	simulation	in	which	the	microelements	consist
of	individual	investors,	while	in	the	context	of	simulating	the	rational	deliberations	of	an	individual	we	may	take
that	person	to	be	the	macrosystem	and,	say,	the	individual	neurons	of	her	brain	to	be	the	microelements.
If	we	want	to	stick	with	the	requirement	that	any	simulation	that	derives	the	presence	of	a	weakly	emergent
property	be	"fully	specific"	then	there	seem	to	be	only	two	principled	options.	On	the	one	hand,	we	could	just
accept	that	full	specificity	here	will	always	just	be	relative	to	the	choice	of	microelements.	The	problem	here	is
that	if	nothing	more	is	said	about	choice	of	microelements	other	that	it	"shifts	with	our	interests"	then	this
threatens	to	trivialize	the	whole	notion	of	simulation.	Implicit	in	much	of	the	philosophical	discussion	of	weak
emergence	is	that	microelements	stand	in	something	like	a	part	/	whole	relation	to	their	respective
macrosystems.	But	with	no	constraints	on	which	pieces	of	a	whole	system	count	as	parts,	we	are	free	to	pick	all
kinds	of	gerrymandered	ways	of	carving	up	the	whole.
For	present	purposes,	the	most	worrying	possibilities	are	where	the	whole	is	divided	into	very	few
'microelements.'	Consider	a	situation	in	which	there	is	an	analytic	equation	that	governs	some	simple	dynamical
system,	but	there	are	two	distinct	equations	for	the	two	halves	of	the	system.	For	example,	the	system	might
involve	fluid	flow	on	the	surface	of	a	sphere.	In	the	'northern	hemisphere,'	the	fluid	moves	at	a	constant	velocity,
v,	in	a	clockwise	direction	around	lines	of	longitude,	while	in	the	'southern	hemisphere,'	it	moves	at	some
different	constant	velocity,	v'.	It	seems	clear	that	this	is	a	paradigm	case	where	there	are	no	weakly	emergent
properties.	Indeed	by	stipulation	the	system	is	governed	at	each	point	by	a	single	analytic	equation.	However,
we	need	to	consider	the	following	line	of	objection:	there	are	dynamical	properties	of	this	system	which	are
weakly	emergent	because	the	only	way	to	predict	the	future	position	of	all	the	points	on	the	surface	of	the
sphere	is	by	dividing	the	sphere	into	two	halves	and	calculating	the	position	separately	for	each	half.	And	since
these	two	halves	could	be	taken	to	be	'microelements',	this	procedure	counts	as	a	simulation.
The	proper	response	to	this	objection	is	to	point	out	that	it	ignores	a	second	facet	of	the	specificity	of
simulations.	Simulations	are	not	merely	synchronically	specific—in	that	they	examine	the	behavior	of	each
microelement—but	they	are	also	diachronically	specific—in	that	they	calculate	the	full	state	of	the	system	at
each	time	step.	In	the	sphere	example	presented	above,	even	if	there	is	a	certain	sense	in	which	the	two
hemispheres	can	be	regarded	as	potential	'microelements,'	the	equations	governing	each	half	are	still	analytic.
Thus	the	positions	of	every	point	on	the	sphere	can	be	calculated	for	some	arbitrary	future	time	without	going
through	every	(or	indeed	any)	intermediate	time	steps.	Of	course	the	arbitrariness	of	cashing	full	specificity	out
in	relation	to	time	steps	is	even	more	obvious	than	for	the	case	of	microelements.	Indeed	in	most	cases	the
system	being	simulated	is	dynamically	continuous,	hence	whatever	discrete	time	steps	are	chosen	for	the
simulation	involves	some	loss	of	specificity	relative	to	the	original	system.
This	is	an	important	point,	and	one	that	it	is	worth	pausing	for	to	pursue	a	little	further.	As	Rasmussen	and
Barrett	(1995)	highlight,	typically	"the	simulation	and	the	simulated	system	are	both	dynamical	systems."	(p.	4)
Given	the	problems	discussed	above	with	simply	making	'full	specificity'	relative	to	(possibly	arbitrary)	choice	of
microelements	and	time	step	units,	a	second	option	is	to	insist	that—at	least	for	the	purposes	of	defining	weak
emergence—simulations	be	'full'	in	some	absolute	sense.	(Compare	Symons	(2008),	who	talks	of	weakly
emergent	features	as	"those	which	can	be	derived	from	the	microdynamics	of	the	system	only	by	an	exhaustive
simulation.")	Let	us	focus	for	the	moment	on	synchronic	specificity,	and	think	about	what	"full,"	or	"complete,"	or
"exhaustive"	simulation	might	amount	to.
One	possible	response	is	to	say	that	a	truly	complete	simulation	of	a	real-world	system	amounts	to	duplicating
the	system.	In	other	words,	a	complete	simulation	is	not	a	simulation	at	all!	Though	not	targeted	at	issues	of
complexity	and	emergence,	physicist	Max	Tegmark	has	recently	proposed	what	he	terms	"the	Mathematical
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Universe	Hypothesis"	(or	MUH),	which	is	the	claim	that	"our	external	physical	reality	is	a	mathematical
structure."	(Tegmark	2007,	p.	3)	His	defense	of	this	claim	is	strikingly	direct:
Whereas	the	customary	terminology	in	physics	textbooks	is	that	the	external	reality	is	 described
by	mathematics,	the	MUH	states	that	it	 is	mathematics.	…	We	write	is	rather	than	corresponds	to
here,	because	if	two	structures	are	isomorphic,	then	there	is	no	meaningful	sense	in	which	they
are	not	one	and	the	same.	(Tegmark	2007,	p.	4)
This	argument	seems	too	quick.	Tegmark's	background	assumption	is	that	the	universe	is	fully	describable	in
terms	of	its	structural	properties,	since	any	non-structural	properties	would	make	no	observable	difference.	But
even	if	one	grants	this	(far	from	innocuous)	assumption,	it	does	not	follow	that	the	universe	is	no	more	than	a
complex	mathematical	structure.	Shapiro	(1997)	makes	a	useful	distinction	between	structures	which	are
freestanding	and	those	which	are	not.	Freestanding	structures	are	basically	those	for	which	full	simulation	and
instantiation	coincide.	Take	the	game	of	chess.	Any	arrangement	of	objects	which	conforms	to	the	structural	and
dynamical	constraints	of	the	rules	of	chess	is	a	game	of	chess.	It	does	not	matter	what	the	pieces	are	made	of,
or	how	quickly	the	game	proceeds.	Chess	games	can	be	played	with	pieces	of	plastic,	or	pieces	of	ivory,	or
using	people	as	'pieces.'	It	can	be	played	at	a	lightning	pace,	or	by	mail	over	a	period	of	years.	Chess	can	also
be	played	on	computers	and	by	computers.	But	it	would	be	odd,	in	fact	not	just	odd	but	false,	to	say	that	a
computer	was	merely	'simulating'	the	playing	of	chess.	When	the	computer	Deep	Blue	defeated	then-world
champion	Gary	Kasparov	in	the	famous	1997	match,	Deep	Blue	was	literally	playing	chess.	Thus	chess	is	a
freestanding	structure.[5]
Shapiro	thinks	that	many	structures	are	non	freestanding.	One	example	he	gives	is	of	a	certain	defensive
arrangement	in	baseball.	It	is	not	enough,	in	order	to	instantiate	this	defense,	merely	to	have	objects	of	some
kind	or	other	at	the	appropriate	locations	on	a	baseball	field.	Thus	a	structure	consisting	of	piles	of	rocks	at	the
different	locations	is	not	a	baseball	defense.	Against	Shapiro's	claim	here,	one	might	argue	that	he	is	ignoring
precisely	the	distinction	that	we	have	been	targeting,	between	simulation	and	full	simulation.	Thus	Deep	Blue
counts	as	literally	playing	chess	because	Deep	Blue	is	fully	simulating	the	structure	of	the	game	of	chess.	By
contrast,	the	pile	of	rocks	on	the	baseball	field,	while	it	might	count	as	a	simulation	of	some	sort,	is	not	fully
simulating	a	baseball	defense,	because	there	are	various	structurally	relevant	properties	that	are	omitted	(for
example,	the	ability	to	move	the	ball	from	one	position	on	the	field	to	another).	So	there	are	not	two	kinds	of
structures	here,	freestanding	and	non-freestanding,	but	rather	two	kinds	of	simulation,	full	simulation	and	partial
simulation.[6]
Lest	we	get	too	far	afield	from	our	original	topic,	I	will	not	pursue	the	above	issues	any	further.	However,	it	is
worth	pointing	out	that—whether	or	not	full	simulation	is	the	same	as	duplication—full	simulation	in	this	absolute
sense	is	impossible	as	a	practical	matter	for	the	vast	majority	of	real-world	systems	that	are	of	interest	to
complexity	scientists.	Hence	it	would	likely	violate	the	third	criterion	mentioned	earlier,	that	the	notion	of	weak
emergence	being	defined	be	relevant	to	scientific	practice,	for	it	to	be	linked	to	any	such	'absolute'	sense	of
simulation.[7]
Between	Simulation	and	Analytic	Derivation
One	could	claim	that	I	have	been	unduly	pessimistic	about	the	first	of	the	two	options	discussed	in	the	last
section,	since	it	is	not	obvious	that	the	only	alternative	to	absoluteness	is	arbitrariness.	In	other	words,	it	would
seem	that	there	is	room	to	argue	for	a	notion	of	"full	simulation"	which	is	relative	to	choice	of	microelements	and
time	units,	but	where	these	are	picked	out	based	on	objective	features	of	the	system	being	simulated.	(An
analogy	here	might	be	with	approaches	to	anchoring	the	objectivity	of	inductive	reasoning	in	science	by
reference	to	some	background	ontology	of	natural	kinds.)	I	am	not	sure	whether	this	approach	could	be	made	to
work,	and	if	so	how,	but	for	sake	of	argument	let	us	assume	that	it	can.	Plugging	the	result	back	into	Bedau's
definition	yields	a	notion	of	weak	emergence	according	to	which	weakly	emergent	properties	can	only	be	derived
by	a	simulation	that	is	completely	specific	relative	to	the	given	(non-arbitrary)	microelements	and	time	units.
Even	granting	all	of	the	above	assumptions,	however,	there	are	still	potential	problems	with	this	line	of	analysis.
For	illustrative	purposes,	let	us	return	to	the	earlier	example	from	Bedau	of	the	R	pentomino	in	the	Game	of	Life
and	whether	it	exhibits	unbounded	growth.	Recall	that,	as	Bedau	describes	the	situation,	the	only	way	to	see
that	growth	in	this	case	is	bounded	is	to	iterate	the	microdynamic	for	1103	time	steps	until	a	stable	pattern
appears.	Hence,	the	bounded	growth	of	the	R	pentomino	is	a	weakly	emergent	property	of	it.
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At	first	glance,	this	seems	to	fit	with	the	definition	of	"full	simulation"	that	was	presented	above,	since	the
process	of	establishing	stability	is	completely	specific:	the	color	of	each	cell	on	the	grid	is	calculated	for	each
time	step	until	step	1103.	But	at	second	glance,	the	situation	is	not	so	clear-cut.	In	particular,	there	is	room	to
argue	that	the	'simulation'	is	neither	synchronically	nor	diachronically	exhaustive.	From	a	synchronic
perspective,	not	every	cell	is	updated	individually	at	each	time	step.	Indeed	this	is	impossible	from	a	practical
perspective	since	the	Game	of	Life	takes	place	on	an	infinite	grid!	More	prosaically,	given	the	update	rule	we
know	that	any	'dead'	cell	that	is	surrounded	by	dead	cells	itself	remains	dead	at	the	next	time	step.	So	the	infinite
array	of	empty	cells	surrounding	the	R-pentomino	initial	condition	can	simply	be	ignored	for	the	purposes	of
simulation.[8]	From	a	diachronic	perspective,	there	is	indeed	complete	specificity	for	the	first	1103	time	steps	of
the	simulation,	but	at	this	point	the	simulation	ends	and	a	different	form	of	reasoning	takes	over.	For	it	is	not—
and	cannot	be—purely	on	the	basis	of	simulation	that	we	come	to	know	that	the	state	at	time	step	1103	is	stable.
It	turns	out	that	this	state	is	made	up	of	a	collection	of	two	sorts	of	sub-patterns:	"still	lifes"	are	a	2×2	blocks	of
living	cells,	which	remain	unchanging	forever	given	the	update	rule	for	the	Game	of	Life;	"blinkers"	which	are
vertical	strips	of	three	living	cells,	which	alternate	between	a	vertical	3-strip	and	a	horizontal	3-strip	at
successive	time	steps.
I	want	to	argue	that	our	knowledge	of	the	stability	of	still	lifes	and	of	blinkers	is	not	based	on	simulation.	If	it	was,
then	according	to	Bedau's	analysis,	the	property	of	unchangingness	of	the	still	life	pattern	would	count	as	weakly
emergent,	and	this	seems	to	go	against	the	whole	spirit	of	his	approach.	If	I	am	right,	then	our	knowledge	of	the
bounded	growth	of	the	R	pentomino	is	based	partly	on	simulation	and	partly	on	more	traditional	mathematical
analysis.	As	Bedau	himself	puts	it,
[I]n	some	situations	it	is	possible	to	construct	a	quite	different	'short-cut'	derivation	of	a	system's
macro	properties,	perhaps	using	a	simple	mathematical	formula	for	the	evolution	of	a	certain
macro	property	arbitrarily	far	into	the	future.	(Bedau	2003,	p.8)
This	poses	an	obvious	problem	for	a	notion	of	weak	emergence	based	on	full	simulation,	since	we	are	forced	to
conclude	that	the	property	in	the	R-pentomino	case	is	not	weakly	emergent	because	it	can	be	(indeed	it	must
be)	derived	without	fully	simulating	the	system.
There	are	at	least	a	couple	of	responses	that	could	be	made	here	on	behalf	of	the	defender	of	the	full-simulation
definition.	One	response	is	to	argue	that	recourse	to	analytic	methods,	though	possible	in	the	R-pentomino
case,	could	not	have	been	predicted	in	advance	except	by	going	through	the	simulation	up	to	time	step	1103.
Hence,	from	an	epistemological	point	of	view,	the	simulation	is	still	an	indispensable	part	of	the	derivation
process.	A	second	response	is	to	maintain	that	the	above	argument	equivocates	between	two	conditions,	and
thereby	conflates	'being	derivable	only	by	full	simulation'	with	'being	fully	derivable	by	simulation.'	It	is	the	former
of	these	two	conditions	which	appears	in	the	revised	version	of	Bedau's	definition	of	weak	emergence,	and	this
condition	(unlike	the	second	condition)	is	fully	compatible	with	the	full	simulation	being	augmented	by	other
modes	of	reasoning.
The	effectiveness	of	both	of	these	defenses	may	hinge	in	part	on	the	nature	of	the	(putatively)	weakly	emergent
property	being	discussed.	In	particular,	some	properties	involve	implicit	existential	claims	about	the	future	state
of	the	system,	while	other	properties	involve	implicit	universal	claims.	To	take	a	simple	case,	the	property	of
"stability"	in	the	Game	of	Life	involves	an	implicit	claim	that	is	existential,	namely	that	there	is	some	future	state
of	the	system	which	is	identical	to	an	earlier	state	(which	thereby	guarantees	that	the	system	has	entered	into	a
closed	cycle).	The	stronger	property	of	"unchangingness"	involves	an	implicit	universal	claim,	that	all	future
states	of	the	system	are	identical	to	the	current	state.	The	property	of	"bounded	growth,"	which	is	the	property
that	Bedau	focused	on	initially	in	his	discussion	of	the	R-pentomino	case,	is	more	complicated.	Both	stability	and
unchangingness	are	sufficient	for	bounded	growth,	but	neither	is	necessary.	To	see	why	not,	recall	from	our
earlier	discussion	of	the	Game	of	Life	that	there	is	another	five-cell	arrangement	called	a	"glider"	which	changes
back	into	the	same	pattern	after	every	fourth	time	step,	except	that	the	pattern	is	shifted	one	cell	diagonally.
Consider	an	initial	configuration	consisting	only	of	two	gliders	'pointed'	in	opposite	directions.	As	the	system
evolves	over	time,	the	two	gliders	move	gradually	off	to	infinity.	No	state	is	ever	identical	to	any	previous	state,
yet	there	is	clearly	an	upper	bound	to	the	number	of	live	cells	that	ever	appear	in	any	future	state.[9]
My	general	claim—which	I	shall	not	further	argue	for	here—is	that	properties	associated	with	implicit	universal
claims	cannot	be	derived	by	full	simulation.	The	only	way	to	justify	a	categorical	claim	about	all	future	states	of
an	open-ended	system	is	through	analytic	methods.	Yet	there	seems	no	reason	why	properties	of	this	sort
cannot	be	weakly	emergent,	indeed	"bounded	growth"—in	the	second	sense	specified	above—seems	to	be	a
good	candidate	for	just	such	a	property.	The	key	point	is	that	for	universal-linked	properties,	there	is	no	sense	of
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running	a	simulation	and	'waiting	for	the	first	appearance	of	the	relevant	state.'	Of	course	if	we	abandon	the
insistence	on	full	simulation	in	our	definition	of	weak	emergence,	then	there	is	still	clarificatory	work	to	be	done.
The	main	challenge,	once	we	allow	in	some	abstraction	to	our	simulations	of	weakly	emergent	properties,	is	to
show	a	principled	line	can	then	be	drawn	between	simulation	on	the	one	hand	and	fully	analytic	methods	on	the
other.
Epistemological	Ramifications	of	Derivation
I	argued	earlier	that	Bedau's	definition	of	weak	emergence	is	intended	to	carve	out	a	notion	which	is	objective
and	independent	of	the	cognitive	capacities	of	any	particular	observer.	The	main	issue	with	which	we	have	been
grappling	in	the	intervening	sections	is	whether	an	appropriate	notion	of	"full	simulation"	can	be	circumscribed
which	gives	teeth	to	Bedau's	definition.	In	the	remainder	of	the	paper,	I	want	to	look	more	briefly	at	the
epistemological	features	of	weak	emergent	properties	thus	defined.	In	other	words,	what	does	it	mean	for	such
core	epistemological	tasks	as	prediction	and	explanation	for	a	property	to	be	derivable	only	by	simulation?
I	shall	start	with	prediction,	since	there	is	a	fairly	clear	link,	at	least	prima	facie,	between	deriving	the	presence
of	a	property	and	predicting	that	the	property	will	occur.	Indeed,	weak	emergence	is	sometimes	defined	directly
in	terms	of	prediction.	For	example,	(Humphries	2008)	interprets	Bedau	as	equating	weak	emergence	with
computational	incompressibility,	and	writes	that	"prediction	of	future	states	of	computationally	incompressible
systems	must	run	through	each	of	the	intermediate	time	steps	between	the	initial	state	and	the	predicted	state."
(p.	435)	However,	there	are	at	least	a	couple	of	reasons	for	resisting	any	straightforward	equivalence	between	a
property	being	derivable	and	a	property	being	predictable.	Firstly,	derivability	is	a	logical	notion	and	the	bare
existence	of	a	derivation	from	given	premises	does	not	guarantee	anything	about	the	length	or	complexity	of	the
required	derivation.	Hence	weakly	emergent	properties	may	not	be	predictable	by	a	particular	epistemic	agent	if
the	complexity	of	the	required	simulation	outruns	that	agent's	cognitive	capacities.	Secondly,	and	even	more
importantly,	even	if	an	agent	is	in	possession	of	a	valid	derivation	of	the	presence	of	a	given	property,	this	will
not	be	convertible	into	a	genuine	prediction	unless	the	agent	believes	that	the	premises	of	the	derivation	are
true.
Reflection	on	this	point	puts	pressure	on	a	different	facet	of	Bedau's	definition.	The	claim	is	that	weakly
emergent	properties	are	derivable,	but	only	by	simulation.	Thus	far	we	have	been	assuming	that	the	space	of
alternative	methods	to	simulation,	especially	analytic	methods,	are	themselves	well-defined	and	legitimate.	But
derivations,	even	deductively	valid,	'rigorous'	derivations,	come	in	many	guises.	Consider,	for	example,	the
following	derivation,	D*,	of	the	bounded	growth	of	the	R	pentomino.
(D1)	The	initial	configuration	is	a	(single)	R	pentomino
(D2)	If	the	initial	configuration	is	a	R	pentomino	then	growth	is	bounded
(D3)	Hence,	growth	is	bounded
D*	is	clearly	a	valid,	albeit	trivial	derivation	of	the	presence	of	the	property	of	bounded	growth.	And,	equally
clearly,	it	does	not	involve	any	simulation.	So	what	prevents	this	from	being	a	counterexample	to	the	claim	that
the	only	way	to	derive	the	property	of	bounded	growth	for	the	R	pentomino	is	by	simulation?
There	are	a	couple	of	ways	of	trying	to	impose	conditions	on	acceptable	derivations	so	as	to	exclude	'trick'	cases
such	as	D*.	One	way	is	to	impose	some	sort	of	epistemic	constraint	on	the	premises	of	the	derivation,	for
example	that	they	be	justifiably	believed	by	whatever	agent	is	making	the	prediction.	Adopting	this	approach,	D*-
style	cases	would	fall	into	two	sorts.	Either	the	agent	has	no	justification	for	believing	the	truth	of	premise	D2,	in
which	case	the	derivation	fails	to	count	as	legitimate.	Or	the	agent	is	justified	in	believing	D2,	in	which	case—
presumably—this	justification	has	come	either	from	the	agent	having	already	run	a	simulation,	or	from	having
been	informed	of	the	truth	of	D2	by	someone	else	who	has	run	an	appropriate	simulation.	In	either	case,	the
derivation	is	legitimate	but	it	rests,	ultimately,	on	simulation.	While	this	approach	might	therefore	work	as	a	way
of	excluding	spurious	alternative	means	of	derivation,	I	suspect	that	it	may	run	into	trouble	by	also	excluding
many	kinds	of	genuine	simulation.	After	all,	simulations	standardly	begin	with	various	simplifying	assumptions—
discrete	time	steps,	simultaneous	updating,	division	of	the	space	into	equal	cells,	and	so	on—which	are	typically
literally	false.	As	such,	the	'premises'	of	most	simulations	will	not	be	believed	to	be	true	by	the	agent	who
implements	them,	and	if	they	do	happen	to	be	believed	then	this	belief	will	not	be	justified.
A	second,	and	somewhat	different,	approach	to	ruling	out	D*	from	contention	is	to	argue	that	fails	to	be	an
appropriately	general	form	of	argument.	In	other	words,	there	is	nothing	in	D*	which	indicates	what	the	correct
answer	to	the	bounded	growth	question	would	be	for	other	initial	configurations,	nor	how	the	R-pentomino
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/13/1/9.html 7 07/10/2015
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
6.10
behaves	with	respect	to	other	properties.	Clearly	the	contrast	here	is	supposed	to	be	with	analytic	derivations
which	typically	involve	equations	where	different	figures	can	be	substituted	in	to	yield	predictions	of	different
phenomena.	Simulations	also	tend	to	be	applicable	across	a	range	of	initial	conditions	and	for	a	wide	variety	of
different	kinds	of	properties.	To	make	this	approach	work,	more	needs	to	be	done	to	clarify	just	what	it	is	that
weak	emergence	applies	to.	I	will	not	undertake	this	work	here	except	to	note	that	on	Bedau's	account,	despite	it
mostly	being	summarized	as	being	about	properties,	weak	emergence	seems	to	come	out	as	a	three-place
relation.	In	the	R-pentomino	case,	for	example,	what	Bedau	is	concerned	to	show	is	that,	in	the	Game	of	Life,
the	property	of	bounded	growth,	for	the	initial	configuration	of	an	R	pentomino,	is	weakly	emergent.	So	we	have
here	a	three-place	relation	between	system,	property,	and	initial	configuration.	The	insistence	on	generality	of
derivation	amounts	to	requiring	(at	minimum)	that	a	given	derivation	be	applicable	to	more	than	just	one	of	these
triples.
While	generalizability	is	clearly	a	valuable	property	of	derivations,	it	is	much	less	clear	that	it	makes	sense	as	a
necessary	condition	for	adequate	prediction.	Mathematicians,	for	example,	tend	to	prefer	generalizable	proofs,
but	they	seem	to	value	such	proofs	for	their	explanatory	potential	as	opposed	to	any	extra	justificatory	power.
Indeed,	ultra-specific	proofs	are	still	taken	to	provide	a	perfectly	adequate	justification	of	their	conclusions.	This
provides	a	nice	segue	into	the	second	facet	of	derivability	that	I	want	to	examine,	namely	the	relation	between
the	presence	of	a	property	being	derivable	only	by	simulation	and	its	explicability	(or	lack	thereof).
It	is	worth	recalling	that	the	main	form	of	"autonomy"	that	Bedau	credits	to	weakly	emergent	properties	is
explanatory	autonomy.	These	properties	are	ontological	and	causally	reducible	to	their	underlying
microproperties,	but	they	are	nonetheless	explanatorily	autonomous.	Symons	agrees	that	one	should
"distinguish	computational	models	or	explanations	from	reductions."	(Symons	2008,	p.	476)	It	certainly	seems
correct	that	not	all	derivations	are	also	explanations.	As	above,	one	way	to	see	this	point	is	by	considering
different	kinds	of	proof	in	mathematics.	There	are	some	well-known	mathematical	proofs,	for	example	Appel	and
Haken's	1976	proof	of	the	4-Color	Theorem,	which	require	the	aid	of	computers	because	they	are	highly
disjunctive	and	require	going	individually	through	many	thousands	of	subcases.	Aside	from	worries	about	the
very	involvement	of	computers	in	this	process,	most	mathematicians	find	the	proof	of	this	result	unsatisfying
because	they	do	not	see	it	as	explaining	why	the	theorem	holds.
Not	only	does	Bedau	argue	for	the	explanatory	autonomy	of	weakly	emergent	properties,	he	also	distinguishes
(Bedau	2003)	between	two	ways	in	which	this	explanatory	autonomy	can	manifest	itself.	On	the	one	hand,	there
are	"accidental"	weakly	emergent	properties	of	a	system,	where	our	explanations	in	terms	of	macrofeatures	are
required	by	the	complexity	of	the	underlying	processes,	but	where	this	explanatory	autonomy	is	"merely
epistemological."	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	"robust"	weakly	emergent	properties	whose	macro-explanations
are	autonomous	in	a	deeper	sense.	To	illustrate	the	distinction,	Bedau	again	turns	to	his	favorite	milieu	of	the
Game	of	Life.	His	example	of	a	robust	property	is	the	configuration	of	cells	known	as	a	"glider	gun."	As	the	name
suggests,	this	configuration	produces	a	steady	stream	of	gliders	that	move	at	an	even	spacing	in	one	particular
direction.	He	contrasts	this	with	"an	irregular	collection	of	still	lifes,	blinkers,	and	miscellaneous	piles	of	'muck'
that	happens	to	emit	six	gliders."	(Bedau	2003,	p.	19)	In	this	latter	case,	Bedau	claims	that	the	property	of
producing	a	stream	of	gliders	is	"accidental."	He	cashes	out	difference	in	counterfactual	terms.	In	the	case	of	the
glider	gun,	but	not	in	the	case	of	the	irregular	configuration,
the	aggregate	micro	explanation	…	omits	information	[that]	supports	counterfactuals	about	the
stream.	…	If	those	micro	histories	had	been	different,	the	macro	explanation	could	still	have	been
true.	(Bedau	2003,	p.	19)
Whether	proper	sense	can	be	made	in	this	context	of	the	notion	of	an	"accidental"	property	is,	I	think,	an
important	and	interesting	question.	(One	intuitive	reaction,	for	example,	is	that	in	a	fully	deterministic	system
such	as	the	Game	of	Life,	nothing	is	accidental	…!)	I	suspect	that	at	best	the	distinction	Bedau	is	pointing	is	a
matter	of	degree.	For,	aside	from	its	greater	complexity,	I	see	nothing	qualitatively	different	between	the
behavior	of	the	'miscellaneous	piles	of	muck'	and	of	the	glider	gun.	Bedau	writes,	in	the	course	of	cashing	out	his
counterfactual	analysis	of	the	latter,	that	"the	same	glider	stream	would	have	been	produced	if	the	configuration
had	been	changed	in	any	number	of	ways,	as	long	as	the	result	was	a	gun	that	shot	the	same	kind	of	gliders."
(Bedau	2003,	p.	19)	But	this	counterfactual	condition	seems	almost	completely	circular,	and	a	precisely	parallel
point	could	be	made	about	the	miscellaneous	piles	of	muck—gliders	would	still	have	been	produced	as	long	as
the	same	miscellaneous	piles	lay	at	the	core	of	the	initial	configuration	of	cells.
The	second	place	where	I	part	company	with	Bedau	concerns	the	role	of	the	microlevel	behavior	in	the	glider-
gun	example.	According	to	Bedau	this	detailed	causal	history	does	explain	the	stream	of	gliders,	it	is	just	that	the
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macro-level	gives	a	better	explanation	and	captures	features	linked	to	generality	and	robustness	that	are	left	out
of	the	micro-level	explanation.	My	own	view	is	that	in	this	sort	of	case,	the	micro-level	story	does	not	explain	the
macro	behavior	at	all.	It	can	be	used	to	predict	this	macro	behavior,	at	least	in	principle,	but	it	plays	no	part	in
the	proper	explanation	of	it.[10]
Conclusions
My	concern	in	this	paper	has	been	to	examine	an	approach	to	emergence	that	defines	emergent	properties	in
terms	of	what	can—and	can	only—be	derived	by	simulation.	If	such	a	definition	is	to	be	objective	and	to	have
real	content	then	this	puts	pressure	on	the	notion	of	simulation.	In	particular,	without	reasonably	precise
boundaries	between	simulation-based	and	non-simulation-based	techniques,	the	definition	threatens	to	collapse
into	uselessness.	I	have	argued	that,	although	the	core	notion	of	simulation	is	well-understood,	and	although
canonical	cases	of	simulation	are	uncontroversial,	placing	principles	bounds	on	it	is	surprisingly	difficult	to	do.	If
we	are	successful,	then	the	prospects	for	the	resulting	notion	of	weak	emergence	charting	a	path	between
being	'mysteriously'	strong	and	being	trivially	weak	look	promising.	While	there	is	every	hope	that	such	a	notion
will	be	coherent	and	scientifically	relevant,	there	remains	work	to	do	in	delineating	the	relation	between
possessing	a	simulation-based	derivation	of	the	presence	of	a	property	and	being	able	to	predict	it	or	explain	it.
Exploring	further	the	epistemological	ramifications	of	this	style	of	definition	is	likely	to	provide	fruitful	terrain	for
future	research.
Notes
1	Note	that	Bedau	(1997)	gives	a	slightly	different	version	of	this	definition:	"Macrostate	P	of	S	with
microdynamic	D	is	weakly	emergent	if	and	only	if	P	can	be	derived	from	D	and	S's	external	conditions	but	only
by	simulation."
2	A	glider	is	another	configuration	of	five	cells	which	changes	back	into	the	same	pattern	after	every	4th	time
step,	except	that	the	pattern	is	shifted	one	cell	diagonally.
3	The	term	"resultant	property"	was	coined	in	the	late	19th	Century	by	the	philosopher	Samuel	Alexander,	one
of	the	(so-called)	"British	emergentists."	The	guiding	analogy	here	is	the	addition	of	vectors.
4	Note	that	this	is	not	the	same	as	demanding	that	the	notion	of	simulation	have	completely	sharp	boundaries.
For	we	may	end	up—for	independent	reasons—wanting	a	notion	of	emergence	which	is	itself	a	matter	of
degree.
5	Another	area	where	there	is	active	debate	over	the	distinction	between	simulation	and	instantiation	is	in
connection	with	John	Searle's	"Chinese	Room"	thought-experiment.	One	way	of	framing	Searle's	challenge	is	to
clarify	under	what	conditions,	if	any,	simulation	of	syntactic	cognitive	operations	is	sufficient	for	the	instantiation
of	genuine	mental	states.	For	a	useful	overview	of	this	debate,	see	Preston	and	Bishop	(2002).
6There	may	still	be	a	derivative	sense	of	"freestanding	structure"	as	a	structure	for	which	full	simulation	is
possible.	And	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	points	made	about	the	game	of	chess	seem	to	apply	with	equal	force	to
the	Game	of	Life.	Specifically,	there	seems	to	be	no	distinction	between	simulating	the	Game	of	Life	and
instantiating	it.	Also	note	the	slide	between	simulation	and	observation	when	Bedau	(2003)	talks	about	the	R-
pentomino's	bounded	growth.
7Bedau	(2003)	does	distinguish	between	different	'strengths'	of	simulation,	e.g.	between	finite	and	infinite
simulations.	But	it	is	unclear	how	this	intersects	with	the	above	issues.
8More	precisely,	any	empty	cell	that	is	at	least	two	cells	removed	from	a	live	cell	can	be	ignored	at	a	given	time
step.
9It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	in	fact	two	distinct	properties	that	fit	the	term	"bounded	growth."	In	my
discussion	thus	far,	I	have	been	assuming	that	growth	is	bounded	if	and	only	if	there	is	some	upper	bound	on
the	number	of	live	cells	in	any	(individual)	future	state	of	the	system.	However,	the	fact	that	Bedau	talks	of	the
stable	state	reached	at	step	1103	as	"just	fitting	into	a	51-by-109	cell	region"	indicates	that	he	himself	may	have
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a	different	property	in	mind,	such	that	growth	is	bounded	if	and	only	if	there	is	some	finite	area	outside	of	which
no	live	cells	of	any	future	state	appear.	The	first	of	these	two	readings	yields	a	simpler	property	than	the	second,
since	spatial	boundedness	implies	numerical	boundedness,	but	not	vice-versa	(as	the	'double-glider'	example
above	illustrates).
10	Note	that	I	am	implicitly	endorsing	a	view	here	according	to	which	there	is	a	unique	"best"	explanation	for	any
given	phenomenon.
	References
BEDAU	M	A	(1997)	Weak	Emergence.	Philosophical	Perspectives.	 Mind,	Causation,	and	World ,	11.	pp.	375-
399.	[doi:10.1111/0029-4624.31.s11.17]
BEDAU	M	A	(2003)	Downward	Causation	and	the	Autonomy	of	Weak	Emergence.	 Principia	Revista
Internacional	de	Epistemologica,	6.	pp.	5-50.
BERLEKAMP	E	R,	Conway	J	H	and	Guy	R	K	(1982)	 Winning	Ways	for	Your	Mathematical	Plays,	Vol.	2.	New
York:	Academic	Press.
HUMPHRIES	P	(2008)	Synchronic	and	Diachronic	Emergence.	 Minds	and	Machines ,	18.	pp.	431-442.
[doi:10.1007/s11023-008-9125-3]
POUNDSTONE	W	(1985)	The	Recursive	Universe.	Chicago:	Contemporary	Books.
PRESTON	J	and	Bishop	M	(2002)	 Views	into	the	Chinese	Room:	New	Essays	on	Searle	and	Artificial
Intelligence,	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.
RASMUSSEN	S	and	Barrett	C	L	(1995)	Elements	of	a	Theory	of	Simulation.	 ECAL	95,	Lecture	Notes	in
Computer	Science,	Springer	Verlag.
RONALD	E	M	A,	Sipper	M	and	Capcarrère	M	S	(1999)	Design,	Observation,	Surprise!	A	Test	of	Emergence.
Artificial	Life,	5.	pp.	225-239.	[doi:10.1162/106454699568755]
SHAPIRO	S	(1997)	 Philosophy	of	Mathematics:	Structure	and	Ontology .	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.
STEPHAN	A	(2006)	The	Dual	Role	of	'Emergence'	in	the	Philosophy	of	Mind	and	in	Cognitive	Science.
Synthese,	151.	pp.	485-498.	[doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9019-y]
SYMONS	J	(2008)	Computational	Models	of	Emergent	Properties.	 Minds	and	Machines ,	18.	pp.	475-491.
[doi:10.1007/s11023-008-9120-8]
TEGMARK	M	(2007)	The	Mathematical	Universe.	arXiv:	0704.0646v2.
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/13/1/9.html 10 07/10/2015
